Research Interests

My research interests lie in the fields of behavioral economics, experimental economics and microeconomic theory. I have worked on topics ranging from strategic communication and statistical discrimination in labor markets, to decision making under cognitive depletion and the effects of "nudging" strategies. Currently I am working on the topic of fairness preferences when people face limited information regarding others' effort and productivity, and on a new method to incentivize the elicitation of probability distribution beliefs.

Published articles

• de Haan, T., & Linde, J. (2017). "Good Nudge Lullaby: Choice Architecture and Default Bias Reinforcement". Forthcoming in The Economic Journal. Link
• de Haan, T., Offerman, T., & Sloof, R. (2017). "Discrimination in the Labour Market: The Curse of Competition between Workers". The Economic Journal, 127, 603, 1433-1466. Link
• De Haan, T., Offerman, T., & Sloof, R. (2015). Money talks? An experimental investigation of cheap talk and burned money. International Economic Review, 56(4), 1385-1426. Link
• De Haan, T., & Van Veldhuizen, R. (2015). Willpower depletion and framing effects. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 117, 47-61. Link
• Abbink, K., & de Haan, T. (2014). "Trust on the brink of Armageddon: The first-strike game". European Economic Review, 67, 190-196. Link
• de Haan, T., Offerman, T., & Sloof, R. (2011). Noisy signaling: theory and experiment. Games and Economic Behavior, 73(2), 402-428. Link

Work in progress

• A new method to elicit probability distribution beliefs. Working paper
• Fairness preferences in the face of limited information regarding merit. (With Alexander Cappelen, Bertil Tungodden and Caroline Bonn)
• The effect of strategic anchors in a simple bargaining game. (With Jona Linde)
• Bargaining with investment and opportunity cost. (With Gerhard Riener) Working paper
• Preferences for unemployment compensation. (With Cornelius Cappelen)