Research Interests

My research interests lie in the fields of behavioral economics, experimental economics and microeconomic theory. I have worked on topics ranging from strategic communication and statistical discrimination in labor markets, to decision making under cognitive depletion and the effects of "nudging" strategies. Currently I am working on the topic of fairness preferences when people face limited information regarding others' effort and productivity, and on a new method to incentivize the elicitation of probability distribution beliefs.

Published articles

de Haan, T., & Linde, J. (2017). "Good Nudge Lullaby: Choice Architecture and Default Bias Reinforcement". Forthcoming in The Economic Journal. Link
de Haan, T., Offerman, T., & Sloof, R. (2017). "Discrimination in the Labour Market: The Curse of Competition between Workers". The Economic Journal, 127, 603, 1433-1466. Link
De Haan, T., Offerman, T., & Sloof, R. (2015). Money talks? An experimental investigation of cheap talk and burned money. International Economic Review, 56(4), 1385-1426. Link
De Haan, T., & Van Veldhuizen, R. (2015). Willpower depletion and framing effects. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 117, 47-61. Link
Abbink, K., & de Haan, T. (2014). "Trust on the brink of Armageddon: The first-strike game". European Economic Review, 67, 190-196. Link
de Haan, T., Offerman, T., & Sloof, R. (2011). Noisy signaling: theory and experiment. Games and Economic Behavior, 73(2), 402-428. Link

Work in progress

A new method to elicit probability distribution beliefs. Working paper
Fairness preferences in the face of limited information regarding merit. (With Alexander Cappelen, Bertil Tungodden and Caroline Bonn)
The effect of strategic anchors in a simple bargaining game. (With Jona Linde)
Bargaining with investment and opportunity cost. (With Gerhard Riener) Working paper
Preferences for unemployment compensation schemes. (With Cornelius Cappelen)
Side-effects of Strategic Information Revelation. (With Mira Fischer)